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1. Introduction








orientation.	Consider	 the	 following,	 taken	 from	(respectively)	a	pro-
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The	 conceptual	 jumble	 surrounding	 sexual	 orientation	 suggests	
that	 the	 topic	 is	 overripe	 for	 analytical	 philosophical	 exploration.9 
While	 the	delay	 in	 such	 exploration	may	be	due	 to	metaphysicians’	
historical	focus	on	discovering	and	articulating	metaphysically	neces-
sary	truths	about	reality,	recent	feminist	critiques	have	brought	topics	
related	 to	contingent	social	 realities	 into	 the	subfield’s	 focus.	Philos-






of	 sexual	 orientation.	 Its	 target	 is	 twofold:	 (i)	 the	 everyday	 concept	
of	sexual	orientation,	and	(ii)	the	corresponding	concepts	associated	












entation	are	not	meant	 to	apply	across	all	 cultural	 contexts.	 Instead,	
my	project	constructs	a	concept	that	is	both	responsive	to	and	critical	
people,	 I	encourage	you	with	all	good	will	 to	 incorporate	a	gender-neutral	
singular	pronoun	of	your	own	choosing	into	ordinary	English	discourse.
9.	 While	 sexual	 orientation	 has	 received	 little	 attention	 in	 the	 analytical	 tra-
dition,	 the	continental	 tradition	has	a	rich	history	of	 thinking	about	sexual	
orientation	—	see	 Foucault	 (1980)	 and	Halperin	 (1990)	 and	 (2002),	 among	
others.























ies’	 physical	 characteristics	 and	 gender	 as	 a	 classification	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	
on	the	basis	of	social	situatedness.	For	more	on	this	distinction,	see	section	
3.	Also,	 I	acknowledge	that	gender-identity	(the	gender	one	self-attributes)	

























even	 to	 revise	 an	 existing	 concept	—	what	 is	 important	 is	 that	 the	
final	 concept	 serves	 the	 proposed	 purposes.	 In	 some	 cases,	 these	
purposes	may	be	best	served	by	preserving	(e. g.)	the	ordinary	usage,	




served	by	 our	 theorizing,	 then	 a	 theory	 offering	 an	 im-
proved	understanding	of	our	(legitimate)	purposes	and/
or	 improved	conceptual	 resources	 for	 the	 tasks	at	hand	
might	 reasonably	 represent	 itself	 as	 providing	 a	 (possi-
bly	revisionary)	account	of	the	everyday	concepts.	…	The	














conditions	 for	 these	dispositions	 (i. e.,	 the	 conditions	 corresponding	
to	applications	of	the	term	‘sexual	orientation’	and	related	terms),	and	
having	a	particular	sexual	orientation	is	based	upon	what	sex[es]	and	






ries.	Similarly,	 I	use	 the	 terms	 ‘man’	and	 ‘woman’	 to	refer	 to	gender	
categories,	though	I	do	not	assume	that	these	terms	exhaust	or	refer	to	
discrete	gender	categories.











10.	Acknowledging	 that	 some	 people	 wholly	 lack	 dispositions	 to	 sexually	 en-
gage	with	 other	 persons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex-	 or	 gender-attractions	will	 in-
clude	 asexuality	with	 regard	 to	 sex	 and	gender	 among	 the	 class	 of	 sexual	
orientations.


















I	propose	that	 the	 following	purposes	are	 ideally	served	by	our	con-
cept	of	sexual	orientation:
(i) Clarifies	 the	 criteria	 for	 ascribing	 sexual	 orientation,	
as	well	as	how	these	criteria	translate	into	a	taxonomic	
schema	of	sexual	orientation;
(ii) Is	 consistent	 with	 relevant	 social-scientific	 re-
search	—	in	 particular,	 research	 concerning	 sex	 and	
gender;
15.	 These	parts	could	be	conceptually	divided	 into	 two	projects,	one	of	which	
looks	 for	 suitable	 concepts	 in	 light	of	 assigned	purposes,	 and	 the	other	of	
which	engineers	revised	(or	new)	concepts	that	meet	these	purposes	(should	
suitable	ones	not	be	 found	elsewhere).	For	 simplicity,	 I	 am	 including	both	
projects	under	the	heading	of	the	‘engineering	project’.











Haslanger	 acknowledges	 that,	 because	of	 this	flexibility,	 an	engi-
neering	project	will	confront	issues	regarding	how	conceptually	con-
servative	it	intends	to	be	—	i. e.,	whether	it	intends	to	retain,	revise,	or	


































tional,	 or	 even	 nonexistent.18	 Ideally,	 our	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orienta-




































gender,	which	 suggests	 that	 these	understandings	are	not	 informed	









orientation	 as	 concerning	 both	 sex	 and	 gender,	 I	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 het-
erosexuality	picks	out	a	specific	sexual	orientation.	I	believe	that	talk	about	
“heterosexuality”	 in	 ordinary	 discourse	 is	 usually	 talking	 about	 “cishetero-
sexuality”	—	that	is,	the	attraction	of	a	cisgender	woman	to	a	cisgender	man	
or	vice	versa.
17.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 here	 to	 mean	 something	 like	 “not	 cisheterosexual”.	
For	reasons	that	hopefully	become	clear,	I	intentionally	avoid	terms	such	as	
‘same-sex’,	‘homosexual’,	etc.
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orientation	 that	 they	 fail	 to	 recognize.	Given	 this,	 I	will	not	address	
sexual	identity	in	what	follows.	
The	 second	 is	 romantic or emotional attraction.	 Some	 characteriza-
tions	 of	 sexual	 orientation	—	for	 example,	 that	 of	 the	American	Psy-








though	 they	may	 experience	 a	 range	 of	 romantic	 and	 emotional	 at-
tractions.	The	fact	that	asexuality	is	considered	(even	by	asexual	per-
sons)	to	be	a	single	category	within	the	taxonomy	of	sexual	orienta-
tion,	 despite	 asexuals	 reporting	 a	wide	 range	 of	 romantic	 and	 emo-
tional	attractions,	suggests	that	these	latter	attractions	are	captured	by	
concepts	other	than	concepts	of	sexual	orientation.22	(There	is	even	a	
distinct	 taxonomy	for	 these	romantic	and	emotional	attractions,	e. g.,	
‘biromantic’,	‘panromantic’.)	










distinct	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation.	 For	 this	 reason,	my	
21.	 American	Psychological	Association	(2008).
22.	 See	Emens	(2014).
everyday	 concept.	 Instead,	 I	 am	 constraining	 my	 conceptual	 engi-
neering	 so	 that	 it	 is	 responsive	 to	 our	 ordinary	 usage	 by	 generally	
preserving	the	extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orienta-









Framework II: Target Concept
Given	my	project’s	constrained	scope,	it	is	important	to	get	a	sense	of	
the	everyday	concept’s	extension.	To	this	end,	I	will	now	argue	that	we	
should	distinguish	 the	 everyday	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 from	
three	other,	closely	related	concepts.	
The	first	 is	 sexual identity,	which	 I	understand	 to	 refer	 to	 an	 indi-
vidual’s	self-identification	with	regard	to	sexual	orientation.	Because	
sexual	 identity	 concerns	 sexual	orientation	 in	 this	way,	 the	 concept	
of	sexual	identity	is	sensitive	to	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	But	
we	also	acknowledge	that	someone	can	be	self-deceived	or	in	denial	
about	 their	 sexual	 orientation	 (or	 even	 lack	 the	 concepts	necessary	
for	self-identification),	while	still	being	truly	said	to	have	the	sexual	
19.	 I	say	“generally”	because	it	is	unclear	to	me	whether	our	everyday	concept	of	
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Admittedly,	 the	 cultural	 distinction	we	make	between	 sexual	 ori-
entation	and	sexual	druthers	seems	somewhat	arbitrary.	It	is	not	clear	













distinction	 between	 sexual	 druthers	 and	 sexual	 orientation	 (under-
stood	in	terms	of	attraction	to	persons	with	certain	sexes	or	genders).	
No	 one	 is	 interested	 in	 creating	 nondiscrimination	 laws	 to	 protect	




at	 better	 realizing	 these	political	 and	 social	 purposes.	 So,	 given	 the	











project	 is	 not	 directly	 concerned	with	 emotional	 or	 romantic	 attrac-
tion.	That	is,	my	analysis	is	not	concerned	with	emotional	or	romantic	
attractions	that	have	no	effect	upon	one’s	dispositions	toward	sexual	













structure,	 and	 voice	 quality	 are	 all	 examples	 of	 traits	 about	which	
people	may	have	sexual	druthers.	In	order	to	generally	preserve	the	
extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	I	do	not	in-
clude	 sexual	 druthers	 in	my	 account	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 and	 in-






sexual	 intimacy.	Does	having	 only	 this	 higher-order	 desire	 preclude	 such	
a	person	 from	having	a	 sexual	orientation?	 I	would	answer	 “No”	—	not	 so	
long	as	we	consider	asexuality	a	sexual	orientation.	Asexuality	is	generally	
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experience	no	 sex-	 or	 gender-attractions?	These	questions	press	on	





For	my	purposes,	what	 is	 important	 is	 that	—	though	 the	 separat-
ing	line	can	be	fuzzy	—	the	majority	of	cases	show	that	there	clearly	is 
a	distinction	between	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers.	I	leave	
it	 to	 future	 papers	 to	 further	 discuss	 borderline	 cases,	 and	whether	
these	cases	ought	to	affect	the	extension	of	our	concept	of	sexual	ori-
entation;	 the	 following	will	 aim	 toward	a	general	 account	of	 sexual	
orientation	 that	preserves	 the	 central	bases	of	 sexual	orientation	as	
it	 is	ordinarily	understood	—	namely,	 sex-	and	gender-attraction.	For	
this	 reason,	 I	will	 assume	 that	—	just	 as	 sexual	orientation	 concerns	



























ing	 (e. g.)	 solely	 attracted	 to	 redheads	 is	 a	 sexual	orientation?27	And	
if	it	is	not,	what	sexual	orientation	do	such	persons	have,	since	they	












sive	 attraction	 to	 pre-pubescent	 children	 regardless	 of	 their	 sex	 or	 gender.	
Is	 pedophilia	 a	 sexual	 orientation?	 Those	 inclined	 to	 think	 that	 it	 is	not a	
sexual	orientation	might	think	that	it	is	instead	a	sexual	disorder,	which	(un-
like	 sexual	 orientation)	 is	 something	 that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 psychiatric	
and	medical	treatment.	Those	inclined	to	think	that	it	is a	sexual	orientation,	












































32.	 For	 an	overview	of	 recent	philosophical	 approaches	 to	 sex	 and	gender,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 interaction	 between	 philosophical	 approaches	 and	 other	 (e. g.,	

















the	 “unification	view”	—	which	has	 a	 small	 presence	within	 feminist	








29.	See,	 e. g.,	 Butler	 (1990),	 Wittig	 (1992),	 or	 Halpern	 (2002).	 Butler	 and	Wit-
tig	(both	feminist	theorists)	argue	that	sex	classifications	follow	labor-	and	
politically-driven	gender	classifications.	Wittig,	for	example,	writes,	“No	bio-
logical,	 psychological,	 or	 economic	 fate	 determines	 the	 figure	 that	 the	 hu-
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For	example,	someone	may	be	attracted	only	to	transgender	men	who	












this	 latter	 attraction	 is	 anything	more	 than	 a	 sexual	 druther?	 That	
is,	why	 should	we	 think	 that	 someone	 attracted	 only	 to	 cisgender	
women	 has	 a	 different	 sexual orientation	 than	 someone	 attracted	
to	 both	 transgender	 and	 cisgender	women?	This	 line	 of	 argument	
might	suggest	that,	while	we	preserve	the	extension	of	our	ordinary	




























(a)	 The	 account	must	 be	 compatible	with	 the	distinction	be-
tween	sex	and	gender.
If	 the	 cisnormative	 assumption	 and	 unification	 view	 of	 sex	 and	
gender	are	dismissed	—	and	 I	 think	 they	should	be	—	then	 the	unidi-
mensional	view	of	sexual	orientation	also	should	be.	The	distinction	
between	sex	and	gender	allows	for	various	combinations	of	sex	and	
gender	across	 individuals,	making	 it	 clear	 that	an	account	of	 sexual	












	 robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation?
philosophers’	imprint	 –		11		– vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016)
important	 for	ensuring	 legal	and	social	protections	 for	persons	with	
these	attractions,	insofar	as	we	can	reasonably	expect	that	(e. g.)	many	







Of	 course,	 adopting	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 does	 not	 resolve	 the	 issue	 of	
whether	sex	or	gender	(and	therefore	sexual	orientation)	should	be	
understood	in	terms	of	discrete	or	continuous	categories.	I	revisit	this	







which	 features	 are	 the	 basis	 of	 sex	 and	 gender	 categories.	 As	 seen	
from	my	discussion	so	far,	 I	do	assume	that	sex	and	gender	are	real	
(i. e.,	 non-eliminativism),	 that	 sex	 and	 gender	 are	 distinct,	 and	 that	
sex	categories	are	related	to	anatomical	features	while	gender	catego-
ries	are	related	to	relational	and	social	features.	(Of	course,	there	may	
be	overlap	 in	 the	 features	 that	provide	the	basis	 for	sex	and	gender	












acteristics.	 It	 is	not	unusual,	 for	example,	 for	persons	 to	become	un-
interested	in	pursuing	a	relationship	with	someone	upon	discovering	
that	they	are	transgender	or	intersex.	




exclusive	 sexual	 attraction	 to	 transgender	 persons.35	 These	 persons	




















transgender	 rights	activist	Paris	Lees	on	 the	question,	 ‘Is	 trans-oriented	an	
emerging	sexual	orientation?’
36.	See,	e. g.,	Weinberg	&	Williams	(2010);	Money	&	Lamacz	(1984).	












An	 immediate	 difficulty	 for	 behaviorism	 is	 determining	what	 be-
haviors	 and	 span	 of	 time	 are	 relevant	 to	 someone’s	 sexual	 orienta-
tion.	Even	setting	this	aside,	though,	three	more	egregious	problems	
remain.39	First,	behaviorism	doesn’t	allow	that	individuals	can	behav-







psychologically)	 repress	 their	 sexual	desires.	Additionally,	homeless	










to	whether	we	 can	 in	 the	 future	 adopt	 further dimensions	of	 sexual	
orientation,	and	subsequently	expand	our	concept	of	sexual	orienta-
tion.	As	discussed	previously,	my	current	project	 is	 limited	 to	 these	
two	dimensions	because	it	aims	to	construct	a	readily	accessible	but	
politically	and	socially	beneficial	concept	of	sexual	orientation.
Behaviorism and Dispositionalism 
The	previous	 subsection	argued	 that	we	 should	 take	 sexual	orienta-
tion	to	involve	both	sex-	and	gender-attraction.	But	it	is	not	clear	how	











task:	behaviorism and	 ideal dispositionalism.	Both	of	 these	approaches,	




onstrating	how	a	different	 form	of	dispositionalism	—	call	 it	ordinary 
dispositionalism	—	captures	 an	 intuitive	 balance	 between	 actual	 and	
ideal	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual	orientation.
Behaviorism
One	 way	 of	 understanding	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 as	 nothing	 over	
and	 above	 (i. e.,	 as	 reducible	 to)	 one’s	 observable behaviors —	that	 is,	
as	 something	 solely	 concerning	 behavior	 and	 not	 at	 all	 concerning	










m in	 response	 to	 being	 situated	 in	 stimulating	 circum-









A	 person’s	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 determined	 solely	 by	
what	 sex[es]	 and	gender[s]	of	persons	S	 is	disposed	 to	
sexually	engage	under	certain	stimulating	circumstances.
This	 claim	 is	 enough	 to	 get	 us	 to	 the	position	 that	 there	 is	 some 




to	 c would	 make	 the	 view	 indistinguishable	 from	 behaviorism	—	if	


























ally	 specific	 sexual	 behaviors.	 Behaviorism	 fails	 to	 do	 this.	And	 yet	
behaviorism	admittedly	 captures	 something	 important	 about	 sexual	






42.	 See,	 for	 example,	 the	 near-universal	 recognition	 of	 the	 total	 failure	 of	 so-
called	“reparative	therapy”.
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While	I	think	that	this	type	of	proposal	rightly	pushes	against	be-





the	 ideal	 conditions	 for	 (e. g.)	 a	 contemporary	 European	 or	 North	









cept	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 can	 be	 aptly	 applied	within	 all	 of	 these	
widely	ranging	“ideal	conditions”.	 In	other	words,	 the	view	implies	


















tions	—	that	 is,	actual	behaviors.	And	 this	 is	precisely	what	we	want	




In	Edward	Stein’s	The Mismeasure of Desire, he	proposes	that	the	dis-
positions	 relevant	 to	determining	sexual	orientation	manifest	 “under 
ideal conditions”.44	He	goes	on	to	say,	“Conditions	are	ideal	if	there	are	
no	forces	to	prevent	or	discourage	a	person	from	acting	on	his	or	her	
[sexual]	desires,	 that	 is,	when	 there	 is	 sexual	 freedom	and	a	variety	
of	appealing	sexual	partners	available.”45	According	to	Stein,	then,	we	






A	 person’s	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 determined	 solely	 by	
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Ordinary Dispositionalism
The	 problems	 facing	 behaviorism	 and	 ideal	 dispositionalism	 may	
be	 avoided	by	 appealing	 to	 conditions	 somewhere	 between	 “actual”	
and	 “ideal”	 conditions.	 One	 possibility	—	which	 I	 here	 tentatively	








which	 in	 turn	 reveals	what	manifesting	 conditions	 are	 conceptually	



























jected	 into	 ideal	 circumstances.	 In	particular,	when	 surrounded	by	
a	vast	variety	of	 sexual	partners	and	 lacking	any	 inhibitions,	 there	
is	 evidence	 suggesting	 one’s	 sexual	 desires	—	and	 so,	 one’s	 sexual	
behaviors	—	will	undergo	significant	alteration	from	what	they	were	
under	 ordinary	 circumstances.	 In	 particular,	 social	 psychologists	
have	discovered	that	sexual	desires	frequently	increase	or	decrease	
(depending	on	other	characteristics	of	 the	 individual)	 in	situations	
with	high	sexual	opportunity.	The	corresponding	principles,	known	
as	 the	 “satisfaction	 principle”	 (high	 opportunity	 decreases	 desire)	






tions	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 that	 conflict	 with	 our	 everyday	 under-
standing	of	sexual	orientation. To	put	this	in	slightly	stronger	terms:	


























Importantly,	 using	 these	 conditions	 as	 the	 relevant	 manifesting	
conditions	 for	 a	particular	disposition	does	not	mean	 forfeiting	 any	
revision	to	the	everyday	operative	concept.	It	simply	means	that	these	
conditions	 are	 built	 into	 the	 revised	 concept,	 guaranteeing	 that	 the	
everyday	concept’s	extension	is	generally	preserved.	These	conditions	
only	provide	 constraints	on	 the	eligible	 criteria	 for	 ascribing	 sexual	
orientation	—	they	 do	 not	 determine	 these	 criteria,	much	 less	 deter-
mine	the	taxonomy	resulting	from	them.	
More	 needs	 to	 be	 said	 about	 what	 these	 ordinary	 conditions	




poses	behind	 the	manifest	 concept	of	 sexual	orientation,	 they	 importantly	
differ	 in	 the	 interpretation	of	 those	behaviors.	Whereas	those	applying	the	
term	‘sexual	orientation’	may	take	themselves	to	be	(e. g.)	identifying	moral	
failing	or	categorizing	psychological	defects,	this	is	simply	using	fictions	as	
a	mask	 for	what	Haslanger	calls	 the	 “explicitly	 social	 content	of	 the	opera-
tive	concept”.	So	too,	those	applying	the	term	may	take	the	manifesting	con-
ditions	 relevant	 to	 sexual	 orientation	 to	 be	 anything	 from	 “having	 certain	













ifesting	 conditions	 in	 terms	of	 the	 concept	 those	 applying	 the	 term	
take	themselves	to	have,	Choi	restricts	our	search	for	these	conditions	
to	the	conditions	attached	to	manifest	concepts.	But	these	conditions	
may	 be	 nonexistent	 (i. e.,	 “intrinsic	 coolness”)	 or	 severely	mistaken.	















manifesting	conditions”	 that	 identify	a	disposition	by	appealing	to	 the	con-
cept	of	that	very	disposition.	Choi	(2008)	argues	that	this	objection	fails.	As	
he	points	out,	because	 the	ordinary	conditions	 for	a	disposition are	under-
stood	as	“extrinsic	conditions	that	are	ordinary	to	those	who	possess	the	dis-
positional	 concept”,	 those	 persons	need	no	 knowledge	of	 a	 conceptual	 ac-
count	of	the	disposition	in	question.




sexual	orientation	and	 the	sex	or	gender	of	 the	persons	 they	are	at-
tracted	to.













subject	 to	 sexual	 contact	without	 consent,	 or	 possess	 a	prohibitive	
medical	condition.	These	scenarios	indicate	that	it	is	also	important	
to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	the	behaviors	rel-
evant	 to	 ascribing	 sexual	 orientation	 are	 ones	 that	 are	 engaged	 in	

















ditions.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 the	operative	concept	 is	without	 sub-
stance.	 But	 I	 will	 not	 pretend	 to	 articulate	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	
conditions	corresponding	to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orienta-





And	 I	 do	 think	 that	 a	 number	 of	 things	 can	be	 said	 to	 elucidate	
the	 conditions	 under	 which	 we	 typically	 confer	 sexual	 orientation.	
In	particular,	 I	propose	the	 following	as	conditions	constraining	our	





















In	 other	 words,	 I	 propose	 that	—	whatever	 the	 categories	 we	
place	 within	 ‘sexual	 orientation’	—	their	 ascription	 should	 be	 based	
on	the	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	the	persons	someone	is	disposed	to	









are	 particularly	 “deep”	 or	 “self-disclosing”.	 Sexual	 orientation,	 one	might	
think,	 deserves	protection	because it	 is	 deep	 and,	 in	 this	way,	 outside	 (or	




sexual	 orientation	 every	week	 (and	 even	 if	we	 could	 do	 so	 by	 choice),	 I	
would	 insist	 that	 sexual	 orientation	 deserves	 protections.	 However,	 one	
might	worry	that,	even	apart	from	questions	of	protections,	sexual	orienta-
tion	is	a	“deep”	and	unchangeable	(or	nearly	unchangeable)	feature	of	who	
someone	 is.	 I	want	 to	 remain	neutral	on	 this	question,	and	so	 the	 formu-
lation	of	BD	allows	but	does	not	 require	someone’s	 sexual	orientation	 to	
undergo	frequent	shifts.


















struct	 a	 revised	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 I	 appear	 to	 be	 doing	
mere	conceptual	analysis.	To	this,	 I	would	again	emphasize	that	my	
project	is	necessarily	in	part	descriptive	because	it	aims	to	generally	
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orientation	 should	 “reduce	 or	 eliminate	 the	 presumption	 that	 cish-
eterosexuality	is	the	normatively	standard	sexual	orientation	and	all	
queer	sexual	orientations	are	normatively	deviant”,	and	be	“conducive	




the distinction between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations and	
provides a taxonomic schema capable of recognizing persons outside the gen-















gender	 or	 sex	 categories,	 and	 so	 has	 the	 flexibility	 to	 adopt	 a	 vari-
ety	of	sex	and	gender	taxonomies.	With	this	flexibility,	 it	 is	capable	
of	providing	taxonomic	recognition	for	persons	outside	of	the	sex	or	









This	 analysis	 recasts	 sexual	orientation	as	pertaining	 to	bidimen-
sional	attraction	—	that	is,	as	pertaining	to	both	sex-	and gender-attrac-
tion.	But,	importantly,	BD	does	not	require	that,	in	order	to	be	ascribed	
a	 sexual	orientation,	 someone	must	have	a	 certain	 sex-attraction	or	





By	 emphasizing	 only	 these	 dispositions,	 BD	 understands	 sexual	
orientation	solely in terms of the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons one 
is disposed to sexually engage, without reference to the sex or gender of the 



































parency).	 And	 I	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 this.	 In	 fact,	 we	 have	 good	



















































gument	of	an	amicus curiae	brief	filed	by	a	number	of	legal	scholars	in	Henry v. 
Hodges, Supreme	Court	Case	No.	14–556.




























haps,	 to	avoid	this	result,	one	could	 insist	 that	 the	desires	relevant	
to	sexual	orientation	are	those	that	one	would have	in	the	ordinary	





The	first	and	most	 important	 response	 is,	 I	 think,	 to	emphasize	
that	 in	order	 to	achieve	 the	pragmatic	goals	discussed	earlier,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 avoid	 an	 account	 that	 wholly	 psychologizes	 sexual	
orientation.	While	I	 leave	open	that	the	behavioral	dispositions	for	
which	 persons	 need	 political	 and	 social	 protections	 have	 categori-
cal	 psychological	 bases,	 these	 bases	will	 not	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 so-
cio-politically	oriented	account	of	sexual	orientation.	For	these	pur-
poses,	 someone	with	 the	psychological	 features	of	a	 “heterosexual”	
but	queer	behavioral	dispositions	can	and	should	be	protected	from	
































mon	 current	 categories	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 are	 uniformly	discrete.	
In	ordinary	discourse,	we	typically	hear	two,	or	at	best	three,	discrete	
categories:	 “heterosexual”,	 “bisexual”,	 and	 “homosexual”.	 Expanding	
our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	to	include	both	sex	and	gender	will	




Suppose	 someone	 accepts,	 for	 example,	 a	 sex	 binary	 (male	 and	
female)	and	a	gender	binary	 (men/women).	 In	 that	 case,	under	BD,	

















My	 respondent	 might	 be	 fine	 with	 accounting	 for	 sexual	 orien-
tation	 in	 terms	 of	 dispositions	 to	 desire	 rather	 than	 dispositions	 to	
behavior,	 strange	 as	 it	may	 seem.	But	 framing	 sexual	orientation	 in	
this	way	would	not	avoid	yet	another	problem	for	any	desire-based	
account:	 dispositions	 to	 desire	would	 underdetermine	 sexual	 orien-
tation	 because	 desire	 underdetermines	 sexual	 orientation.	 Consider	










posed	only	 to	sexually	engage	with	women.	 In	 this	case,	and	partic-





come	down	to	whether	one	 tends	 to	 think	about	sexual	orientation	










































Under	 a	 view	 such	 as	 this,	 a	 category	 within	 sexual	 orientation	
might	 be	 “C2”,	which	 refers	 to	 someone	who	—	under	 ordinary	 con-




is	 the	 insistence	upon	discrete	categories	 for	sex	and	gender,	which	
leads	to	discrete	categories	of	sexual	orientation.
If	instead	(as	I	prefer)	one	understands	gender	(and	perhaps	sex)	









Illustration 2: Continuous Categories
Gender-Attraction	[Attraction	may	be	represented	at	one,	no,	or	mul-
tiple	locations	on	the	diagram]:
70.	In	other	words,	 I	prefer	an	account	 that	 rejects	epistemicism	about	gender	
categories,	just	as	most	of	us,	I	think,	would	reject	epistemicism	about	‘tall’	or	
‘hot’.










not	be	applied	 to	 cultures	 lacking	 the	concept	of	 sexual	orientation	
within that culture.	 But	 I	 also	 worry	 that	 moderate	 constructionism	
gives	too	prominent	of	a	place	to	biology,	and	underestimates	the	de-




4. Conclusion and Implications
Although	 I’ve	gone	 to	 lengths	 to	 clarify	what	 issues	 I	 do	not	 take	 a	
firm	position	 on,	 I	 do	 not	mean	 to	 leave	 the	 impression	 that	 BD	 is	
an	uncontroversial	thesis.	To	clarify	this,	I	will	briefly	state	its	central	
implications.	
First,	 to	 adopt	 BD	 is	 to	 reject	 our	 current	 taxonomy	 of	 sexual	
orientation.	 The	 assumptions	 that	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 always	 one-
dimensional	—	concerning	 either	 sex-attraction	 or	 gender-attraction,	
75.	 I	 predict	 that	whether	 you	 consider	 this	 a	 realist	 or	 fictionalist	 account	 of	
sexual	orientation	will	largely	depend	on	whether	you	are	a	realist	or	fiction-
alist	 about	 certain	 social	 kinds.	Within	 the	 distinction	 of	 idea-	 and	 object-
construction,	 this	 view	would	 incorporate	 elements	 of	 each.	While	 sexual	
orientation	classifications	would	be	considered	idea-constructions,	the	way	
that	we	are	socially	and	politically	impacted	by	these	classifications	(whether	
our	 self-identity	 aligns	 with	 our	 sexual	 orientation	 or	 not)	 incorporates	 a	
large	dose	of	object-construction	into	our	understanding	of	persons	as	sexu-
ally	oriented	beings.	(For	more	on	this	 issue,	see	Haslanger	&	Sveinsdóttir	



















constructionism.74	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 tentatively	 lean	 toward	 a	mod-




72.	 See,	for	example,	LeVay’s	(2011)	analysis	of	sexual	orientation	as	“the trait that 
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Second,	 BD	 implies	—	but	 does	 not	 necessitate	—	that	 we	 should	
reject	 biological	 essentialism	 about	 sexual	 orientation.	 This	 again	












ing	 sexual	 orientation,	 it	 requires	 that	we	 hesitate	 in	 ascribing	 any	
category	of	 sexual	orientation	 to	an	 individual	on	 the	basis	of	 their	
behavior	without	first	carefully	considering	their	social	context.	This	
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